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This brief is submitted by Defendant/Appellant Century 21 
Mining (hereinafter "Century") in reply to the brief 
heretofore filed by Plaintiff/Appellee Lowell E. Potter 
(hereinafter "Potter"), 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The claim that Century knew of the default judgment for 
a long period before filing its Motion to Set Aside Judgment 
is not supported by the record and is diametrically opposed to 
Potterfs position in related litigation. 
The claim that Potter was not obligated to notify Century 
of the entry of the default judgment is contrary to the legal 
authorities on the subject. On the contrary, the legal 
authorities confirm that Potter had a duty to disclose the 
entry of the default judgment. 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE CLAIM THAT CENTURY 
KNEW OF THE ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR A LONG 
PERIOD PRIOR TO FILING ITS MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE 
JUDGMENT 
In his Brief, Potter repeatedly asserts that Century 
negotiated with Potter with respect to the default judgment 
for a long period of time before Century filed its Motion to 
Set Aside Judgment. The apparent purpose of the claim is to 
create the appearance that Century knew of the judgment for a 
1 
considerable period of time before filing its Motion to Set 
Aside Judgment. 
Potter's claim that Century knew of the judgment by 
reason of a long period of negotiation is based upon two vague 
statements in Potter's Affidavit, Each of these statements 
will be separately addressed to demonstrate the lack of merit 
to Potter's claims. 
The first statement claiming Century's prior knowledge of 
the judgment is in paragraph 2(e) of Potter's Affidavit 
wherein he states that the judgment was "disclosed in 
corporate statements and pro-formas long before this Motion 
was filed." (R. 73). Copies of the alleged "corporate 
statements and pro-formas" containing the "disclosures" are 
noticeably absent from the Affidavit. 
In order to demonstrate Potter's bad faith in claiming 
that Century disclosed the judgment in its corporate financial 
statements prior to filing the Motion to Set Aside the 
judgment, Century calls attention of the Court to a complaint 
which was filed by Potter in related litigation on or about 
October 6, 1992. In the complaint, Potter asserts the exact 
opposite position that he takes in his Brief in this action. 
In paragraphs 7, 8 and 12 of the complaint in the related 
action, Potter alleged that the existence of the judgment had 
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not been disclosed in corporate financial statements, A copy 
of the complaint in the related litigation is attached as 
Addendum Exhibit "A". Moreover, financial statements produced 
in the related litigation establish that the judgment was not 
mentioned in financial statements until 1991, after Century 
filed its Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
The other reference in Potter's Affidavit that Century 
knew of the judgment at an earlier point in time is contained 
in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit (R. 73), wherein Potter claims 
that "Defendants entered into negotiations for settlement of 
the judgment with me," However, there is no suggestion that 
such negotiations occurred prior to December, 1989, when 
Century acknowledged it first learned of the judgment. 
The evidence establishes that the first notice that 
Century received concerning the existence of the default 
judgment occurred in December, 1989 (Drage Affidavit, f 11, 
R. 52). It was only after learning of the judgment in 
December, 1989, that Century attempted negotiations with 
Potter for a period of approximately two and one-half months. 
When the negotiations failed, Century filed its Motion to Set 
Aside on February 26, 1990 (R. 23). Thus, there was no 
unreasonable delay in filing the Motion to Set Aside. 
3 
In reviewing Potterfs Affidavit, one further false 
statement should be noted by the Court. In paragraph 2(a) of 
his Affidavit (R. 72), Potter claims that the Promissory Note 
involved in this action was executed in settlement of 1987 
action. Such statement could not possibly be true. The 1987 
action was filed on March 18, 1987 (R. 43). By Potter's own 
admission, the Promissory Note involved in this action was 
executed on February 28, 1986 (Complaint, f 15, R. 4), more 
than one year prior to the filing of the 1987 action. 
POINT II 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT WAS REQUIRED IN THIS CASE 
On page 7 of his brief, Potter argues that in the 
circumstances of this case, he was not obligated to give 
Century notice of the default judgment. In support of this 
argument, Potter cites Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance Company 
v. D.T. Southern Properties, 838 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1992). 
The Lincoln Benefit case provides no support whatsoever for 
Potter's argument. On the contrary, the Lincoln Benefit case 
confirms the obligation of a party to provide notice of a 
default judgment. The decision states that failure to give 
notice does not invalidate the judgment, but confirms that 
such failure "is an important factor in determining the 
4 
timeliness of post-judgment proceedings, where an exact time 
is not prescribed." 
Century has never asserted that non-compliance with the 
notice requirements of Rule 58A(d) invalidates the default 
judgment. However, Century contends that Potter's failure to 
give notice should be an important factor in determining the 
timeliness of Century's Motion to Set Aside the default 
judgment. Thus, the Lincoln Benefit case supports Century's 
position. 
It should further be noted that Defendant in the Lincoln 
Benefit case received notice of the entry of the judgment in 
the form of service of an Order and Supplemental Proceedings. 
In the instant case, Potter took no enforcement action prior 
to the Motion to Set Aside for the apparent purpose of 
concealing the existence of the default and thereby inducing 
Century to delay filing its Motion to Set Aside. 
Potter should not be permitted to benefit by any delay in 
filing Motion to Set Aside inasmuch as his non-compliance with 
the notice requirements of Rules of Procedure was the cause of 
such delay. 
CONCLUSION 
The claim that Century knew of the judgment prior to 
December, 1989, is not supported by the record before the 
5 
Court and is diametrically opposed to Potter's position in 
related litigation. Century first learned of the judgment in 
December, 1989, and thereafter took appropriate action to 
assert its rights. 
Potter violated his duty to give notice of the entry of 
the default judgment and should not be permitted to benefit by 
the delay which was caused by his non-compliance with the 
express mandates of the procedjiral rules. 
DATED this [^ day of July,I 1993. 
Rdbett M. McDonald 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and accurate copy of the foregoing Reply Brief this day 
of July, 1993, to the following: 
J. Ray Barrios 
First American [Tit]} 
330 East 400 South, 
Salt Lake City,\UT 
ie Building 
Suite ,250 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Complaint in Related Litigation 
EXHIBIT B: Rule 58A(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
J. RAY BARRIOS, P.C. 
FIRST AMERICAN TITLE BUILDING 
330 East 400 South, Suite 250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-3762 
Attorney for Lowell E. Potter 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOWELL E. POTTER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TV COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK, 
INC. a Colorado corporation, 
and CENTURY 21 MINING, INC., 
a Utah corporation a 
subsidiary of TVCN, Inc., 
OMAR A. DUWAIK, individual, 
and JOHN DOES I-X, 
individuals, 
Defendants, 
Plaintiff, Lowell E. Potter, above named, for causes of 
action as against the above named Defendants, states and alleges 
as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Defendant TV Communications Network, Inc. is a Colorado 
corporation authorized to do business in the State of Colorado 
with it's principal place of business in Denver, Colorado, is 
registered with the Securities & Exchange Commission, SEC File # 
1. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. <fc**to£S"SA-<=*> 
Judge -_
 u- A. £pu*U 
33-16113-D, and is a publicly traded company. 
2. Defendant Century 21 Mining, Inc. is a Utah corporation 
authorized to do business in Utah and Colorado with it's current 
principal place of business in Denver, Colorado, is registered 
with the Securities & Exchange Commission as being owned by TV 
Communications Network, Inc. 
3. Defendant Omar A. Duwaik is the President of TV 
Communications, Inc. and is an individual with his principal 
place of residence in Colorado. 
4. Defendants John Does I-X are officers, directors, and/or 
persons providing information for the disclosures to the 
Securities & Exchange Commission, whose names are unknown at the 
present time. 
5. Plaintiff is a resident of the State of Utah, is a 
stockholder in Century 21 Mining, Inc., an is the creditor 
beneficiary of a judgment against Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. Defendants, TV Communications Network, Inc., Century 21 
Mining, Inc., and Omar A. Duwaik in his capacity of President of 
TV Communications Network, Inc. and as an individual have 
disclosed to the public and the Securities & Exchange Commission 
that TV Communications Network, Inc. has purchased a controlling 
interest of Century 21 Mining, Inc., and that such purchase has 
resulted in the following: 
(a) That the assets of Century 21 Mining, Inc. are part 
of the assets of TV Communications Network, Inc.; 
2. 
(b) That Century 21 Mining, Inc. owns 1060 Acres of a 
mining property located in Sierra County, California, known as 
the Mountain House Mine; 
(c) That total outstanding liabilities of Century 21 
Mining, Inc. were all negotiated and settled, or to be settled 
for transfer of stock in TV Communications Network, Inc.; 
(d) That the assets of the two corporations as combined 
included all notes and/or judgment payable as disclosed. 
7. The Defendants, and each of them, knew the above stated 
facts to be false, yet did not include any information regarding 
a judgment obtained by Plaintiff against Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
on December 15, 1988 in the amount of $90,000.00 with interest 
accruing at the rate of 18% per annum. 
8. Defendants, and each of them, knew of the Plaintiff's 
judgment, and the fact that Plaintiff and Defendants had not 
reached any settlement regarding such judgment, yet failed to 
disclose the amount judgment or the fact that such judgment had 
not been settled or satisfied. 
IX * The California mining claims were not owned by Century 
21 Mining, Inc. at the time of disclosure, and whatever asset 
value such mining claims have or may have, which have been 
disclosed on the TV Communications Network, Inc. 10-Q filings to 
the Securities & Exchange Commission, could not properly be used 
as an asset on the books and financial disclosures of either 
Century 21 Mining, Inc. or TV Communications Network, Inc. 
10. Such failure to disclose material, or to disclose false, 
3. 
information to potential buyers, and to the Securities & Exchange 
Commission was done so by Defendants knowingly. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
11. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 
through 10 above as if each were set forth at length herein. 
12. Defendants knowingly and fraudulently failed to disclose 
that Plaintiff had a money judgment against Century 21 Mining, 
Inc. that had not been settled or satisfied at the time of the 
disclosure of assets and liabilities of Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
to the public and to the Securities & Exchange Commission. 
13. Such information was and is material information as to 
knowledge regarding the financial condition of the companies, 
Century 21 Mining, Inc. and TV Communications Network, Inc. 
14. Such failure to disclose such material information 
violates the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, as it 
read at the time of the false disclosures, and/or omissions. 
15. Plaintiff, as a stockholder of Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
has been damaged in that the claimed recorded interest of TV 
Communications, Inc. in Century 21 Mining, Inc. of 65.3% of the 
book value of Century 21 Mining, Inc. of $5,000,000.00 does not 
exist, and Plaintiff's stock is essentially worthless. 
16. Defendant, TV Comminications Network, Inc. offered to 
all stockholders of Century 21 Mining, Inc. an exchange of TV 
Communications, Inc. stock for Century 21 Mining, Inc. stock 
based upon using the claimed Century 21 Mining, Inc. asset, the 
4. 
"Mountain House Mine", as a major asset in TV Communications, 
Inc. finalcial statement to induce the exchange. 
17. The offer was not made to Plaintiff, as a holder of two-
million shares of Century 21 Mining, Inc. stock pursuant to the 
1988 Judgment. 
18. Plaintiff has been damaged to the extent of the false 
disclosures and/or omission concerning the claimed "Mountain 
House Mine" asset, and for the failure to exchange Plaintiff's 
stock pursuant to TV Communications, Inc. offer, in the amount of 
$500,000.00 or such other greater amount as to be proven at trial 
of this cause. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
19. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 
through 18 above as if each were set forth at length herein. 
"20. TV Communications Network, Inc. and/or Century 21 
Mining, Inc. as owned by TV Communications Network, Inc. has 
failed and refused to satisfy the Judgment of Plaintiff and has 
rendered the assets and stock of Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
worthless so Plaintiff cannot satisfy his judgment through the 
assets of Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
21. Plaintiff seeks a permanent injunction against the 
further dissipation of the assets of Century 21 Mining, Inc. by 
TV Communications Network, Inc. to protect the judgment of 
Plaintiff against Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
22. Plaintiff will be irreparably harmed if TV 
5. 
Communications Network, Inc. is allowed to continue to disclose 
to the public that the assets of Century 21 Mining, Inc. are part 
of it's assets when the largest part of such assets are claimed 
to be in the California mining claims which are not owned by 
either TV Communications Network, Inc. or Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
(See Exhibit "A*, TVCN 1991 Annual Report, attached hereto). 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
23. Plaintiff incorporates by this reference paragraphs 1 
through 22 above as if each were set forth at length herein. 
24. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that TV 
Communications Network, Inc. is the sole owner or controlling 
owner of Century 21 Mining, Inc. and that all the assets of 
Century 21 Mining, Inc. have been transferred to TV 
Communications Network, Inc. thus enabling Plaintiff to satisfy 
his judgment against Century 21 Mining, Inc. directly against the 
assets of TV Communications Network, Inc. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendant's, and 
each of them, as follows: 
1. For $500,000.00 general damages against Defendants, and 
each of them, for their knowing, deliberate, willful and 
fraudulent disclosures and omissions in securities documents 
which have rendered Plaintiff's stock in Century 21 Mining, Inc. 
worthless; 
2. For a permanent injunction against the further 
dissipation of Century 21 Mining, Inc. assets; 
3. For a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff can satisfy his 
6. 
judgment against Century 21 Mining, Inc. directly from the assets 
of TV Communications Network, Inc.; 
4. For all Plaintiff's attorney fees and costs of this 
action on each of Plaintiff's causes of action; 
5. For any further relief the Court deems just and proper in 
the premises. 
4k 
Dated this day of October, 1992. 
PLAINTIFF'S ADDRESS; 
428 Pepperridge Drive 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
7. 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 58A 
The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment 
and may advance it on the calendar. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 57, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Oil Shale Corp. v. Larson, 20 Utah 
2d 369, 438 P.2d 540 (1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 22A Am. Jur. 2d Deciara- declaratory relief in state court, 33 A.L.R.4th 
tory Judgments §§ 183, 186, 203 et seq. 146. 
C.J.S. — 26 C J.S. Declaratory Judgments Key Numbers. — Declaratory Judgment e» 
§§ 17, 18, 104, 155. 41, 42, 251, 367. 
A.LJL — Right to jury trial in action for 
Rule 58A. Entry. 
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless the court otherwise 
directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict 
of a jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. If there is a special 
verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories re-
turned by a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the appropriate 
judgment which shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed. 
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided in Subdivision (a) hereof 
and Subdivision (b)(1) of Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge 
and filed with the clerk. 
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judg-
ment docket. A judgment is complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property, when the same is 
signed and filed as herein above provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The prevailing party shall 
promptly give notice of the signing or entry of judgment to all other parties 
and shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk of the court. How-
ever, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the notice require-
ment of this provision. 
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party dies after a verdict or 
decision upon any issue of fact and before judgment, judgment may neverthe-
less be rendered thereon. 
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is au-
thorized by statute, the party seeking the same must file with the clerk of the 
court in which the judgment is to be entered a statement, verified by the 
defendant, to the following effect: 
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money due or to become due, it 
shall concisely state the claim and that the sum confessed therefor is 
justly due or to become due; 
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the purpose of securing the 
plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim 
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same; 
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